| Selecting the troops |
| Brigadier General John K. Lawson |
| Training |
| The Officers |
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Click related sites See a list of other books on The Battle of Hong Kong. BOOKS ON THE BATTLE OF HONG KONG Post your comments. |
The Royal Rifles of Canada, from Quebec City, were under the
command of Lt. Col. William James Home. The Winnipeg
Grenadiers, were under the command of Lt. Col. J.L.R. Sutcliffe.
Both Battalions selected were placed under the unified command of
recently promoted Canadian Brigadier General J.K. Lawson from
Ottawa, Ontario, who, by odd coincidence, had been assigned the
task of writing the combat fitness reports on various units in the
Canadian Army. He had judged both the Royal Rifles and the
Grenadiers as unfit. Now ... he was their Commanding Officer.
It has been said that The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg
Grenadiers lacked training and equipment. However the Royal
Rifles had almost one full year of duty under their web belts during
which they trained constantly. The 212 vehicles they had been
assigned were placed aboard a freighter called the Don Jose which
left Vancouver a few days after the troops and was to follow them
to Hong Kong. The ship was diverted to Manila after Pearl Harbor
was attacked and the equipment was used by the Americans in the
defense of the Philippines. There was no way to replace them and
any new equipment issued was destined for Europe where there
was a war already underway. The Canadians were definitely short
of equipment and supplies.
Brigadier General
John K. Lawson
The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers had been
trained in the use of the basic standard issue weapons available to
the infantry at that time. Because of the nature of their posting the
Royal Rifles perhaps had a slight edge in training. Infantry training
means getting to know your basic weapon inside and out. Soldiers
took them apart, put them together again until it could be done
blind folded. Shooting them was another story. Shooting live
ammunition was ... expensive.
No soldier in any army came out of basic training with a guarantee
stamped on his forehead saying, "Under any battle conditions, even
in the face of savage enemy fire, this soldier shall perform according
to Military Specifications defining skills, and courage, and
determination as outlined in K.R. Army, Section 007, or double the
cost of training cheerfully refunded." It didn't happen then, and it
doesn't happen now.
command of Lt. Col. William James Home. The Winnipeg
Grenadiers, were under the command of Lt. Col. J.L.R. Sutcliffe.
Both Battalions selected were placed under the unified command of
recently promoted Canadian Brigadier General J.K. Lawson from
Ottawa, Ontario, who, by odd coincidence, had been assigned the
task of writing the combat fitness reports on various units in the
Canadian Army. He had judged both the Royal Rifles and the
Grenadiers as unfit. Now ... he was their Commanding Officer.
It has been said that The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg
Grenadiers lacked training and equipment. However the Royal
Rifles had almost one full year of duty under their web belts during
which they trained constantly. The 212 vehicles they had been
assigned were placed aboard a freighter called the Don Jose which
left Vancouver a few days after the troops and was to follow them
to Hong Kong. The ship was diverted to Manila after Pearl Harbor
was attacked and the equipment was used by the Americans in the
defense of the Philippines. There was no way to replace them and
any new equipment issued was destined for Europe where there
was a war already underway. The Canadians were definitely short
of equipment and supplies.
Brigadier General
John K. Lawson
The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers had been
trained in the use of the basic standard issue weapons available to
the infantry at that time. Because of the nature of their posting the
Royal Rifles perhaps had a slight edge in training. Infantry training
means getting to know your basic weapon inside and out. Soldiers
took them apart, put them together again until it could be done
blind folded. Shooting them was another story. Shooting live
ammunition was ... expensive.
No soldier in any army came out of basic training with a guarantee
stamped on his forehead saying, "Under any battle conditions, even
in the face of savage enemy fire, this soldier shall perform according
to Military Specifications defining skills, and courage, and
determination as outlined in K.R. Army, Section 007, or double the
cost of training cheerfully refunded." It didn't happen then, and it
doesn't happen now.
A soldier was taught, "must know, should know, and could know".
He must know how to use, how to maintain, and how to make
minor repairs to the basic weapon, his rifle. He should know about
other weapons he would probably have to use: Bren guns,
grenades, etc. He could know about weapons he might come in
contact with, Lewis guns, Vickers guns, or mortars. Not every
soldier in a platoon had to know everything about every weapon
the company might have in its inventory.
"Your rifle is your best friend. Take care of it and it will take care
of you." This credo was drilled into every soldier's head. In
truth...not a lot more was required. Modern techniques of infantry
were developed during and after WWII. The most important thing
taught was the need for absolute discipline. When bullets fired in
anger begin to fly over a man's head and he stays to do the job, he
is a soldier. Before that, he is just a guy in uniform. When the
bullets began to crack overhead in Hong Kong, the Canadians
showed they had discipline in abundance. In that regard they were
the equal of any troops in the garrison. The Canadians went to
Hong Kong short of just about everything ...except courage. They
went to defend a position of dubious military value, but an
undeniable financial gold mine, against impossible odds.
Brigadier F.T. Atkinson, who was a Major during the Battle of
Hong Kong said about the training: "I doubt if any battalions left
Canada with better trained officers than we had." About courage
he said: "We fought just as well as any British soldier."
In the words of Rifleman John Beebe of "D" Company, Royal
Rifles of Canada, No.18 Platoon: "I don't mind telling you right
now, in the face of those stories about how badly trained,
ill-equipped Canadian soldiers who were supposed to have been at
Hong Kong, as far as our outfit went, that was a lot of nonsense.
We had a tough fighting outfit, well led, and well trained. The
training started in Sussex, and it kept right up."
He must know how to use, how to maintain, and how to make
minor repairs to the basic weapon, his rifle. He should know about
other weapons he would probably have to use: Bren guns,
grenades, etc. He could know about weapons he might come in
contact with, Lewis guns, Vickers guns, or mortars. Not every
soldier in a platoon had to know everything about every weapon
the company might have in its inventory.
"Your rifle is your best friend. Take care of it and it will take care
of you." This credo was drilled into every soldier's head. In
truth...not a lot more was required. Modern techniques of infantry
were developed during and after WWII. The most important thing
taught was the need for absolute discipline. When bullets fired in
anger begin to fly over a man's head and he stays to do the job, he
is a soldier. Before that, he is just a guy in uniform. When the
bullets began to crack overhead in Hong Kong, the Canadians
showed they had discipline in abundance. In that regard they were
the equal of any troops in the garrison. The Canadians went to
Hong Kong short of just about everything ...except courage. They
went to defend a position of dubious military value, but an
undeniable financial gold mine, against impossible odds.
Brigadier F.T. Atkinson, who was a Major during the Battle of
Hong Kong said about the training: "I doubt if any battalions left
Canada with better trained officers than we had." About courage
he said: "We fought just as well as any British soldier."
In the words of Rifleman John Beebe of "D" Company, Royal
Rifles of Canada, No.18 Platoon: "I don't mind telling you right
now, in the face of those stories about how badly trained,
ill-equipped Canadian soldiers who were supposed to have been at
Hong Kong, as far as our outfit went, that was a lot of nonsense.
We had a tough fighting outfit, well led, and well trained. The
training started in Sussex, and it kept right up."
The Royal Rifles of Canada amalgamated several militia units to
create a viable force. The Commanding Officer of the Regiment
was Lt. Colonel William James Home, M.C., E.D. a veteran of
WWl who had been with the 8th. Royal Rifles in 1913 and had
served with the Royal Canadian Regiment, Canada's senior unit of
the line from 1915 to 1940. The Second in Command Lt. Col. J.H.
Price, an Artillery officer who had volunteered to take a cut in rank
to Major to become a Company Commander in the RR of C. A
total of 385 officers and men had left other units to form the new
Regiment.
They came from Gaspé, the Eastern Townships, Northern Ontario,
and the maritime Provinces, 16 from Iles de la Madeleine. Only 5
of them returned, a huge loss to a small community. Lt. Col. Tom
MacCauly, D.C.M., E.D. had been with the Commanding Officer
of the Sherbrooke 7/11 Hussars. He, too, took a rank reduction to
become CO of "B" Company, RR of C Company. Lt. Col. C.A.
Young, M.C., E.D., also a veteran of WWl, took on the job of "A"
Company Commander after a voluntary reduction in rank. "C"
Company was under the command of Major W.A. Bishop,
D.S.O., E.D. was awarded his D.S.O. during the Japanese
invasion effective use of his troops, and personal bravery.. Major
Parker had been with the Royal Rifles, first as a Lieutenant and
rising through the ranks to become CO of "D" Company. These
experienced officers built an effective unit with discipline as its
foundation, and courage as its cornerstone
create a viable force. The Commanding Officer of the Regiment
was Lt. Colonel William James Home, M.C., E.D. a veteran of
WWl who had been with the 8th. Royal Rifles in 1913 and had
served with the Royal Canadian Regiment, Canada's senior unit of
the line from 1915 to 1940. The Second in Command Lt. Col. J.H.
Price, an Artillery officer who had volunteered to take a cut in rank
to Major to become a Company Commander in the RR of C. A
total of 385 officers and men had left other units to form the new
Regiment.
They came from Gaspé, the Eastern Townships, Northern Ontario,
and the maritime Provinces, 16 from Iles de la Madeleine. Only 5
of them returned, a huge loss to a small community. Lt. Col. Tom
MacCauly, D.C.M., E.D. had been with the Commanding Officer
of the Sherbrooke 7/11 Hussars. He, too, took a rank reduction to
become CO of "B" Company, RR of C Company. Lt. Col. C.A.
Young, M.C., E.D., also a veteran of WWl, took on the job of "A"
Company Commander after a voluntary reduction in rank. "C"
Company was under the command of Major W.A. Bishop,
D.S.O., E.D. was awarded his D.S.O. during the Japanese
invasion effective use of his troops, and personal bravery.. Major
Parker had been with the Royal Rifles, first as a Lieutenant and
rising through the ranks to become CO of "D" Company. These
experienced officers built an effective unit with discipline as its
foundation, and courage as its cornerstone
