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The Beginning
As Japan's army raged through
China slaughtering thousands of men, women and children, leaving
a path of horrific devastation in its wake, tensions in the West
grew about the security of British possessions in Asia. The
Japanese capture of the British Pratley Islands and Hainan in
1939 left the Colony of Hong Kong isolated and vulnerable. The
Japanese presence in China cast a growing shadow over the
British Colony. England wanted to maintain control of this
valuable world class trading center, but the British Government
was realistic. It knew there was a chance that Japan would
attack the Colony and take it.
It was decided, initially, that if attacked Hong Kong and all
those there would be on their own. It was clear to the English
that in the event of war with Japan, Hong Kong could neither be
successfully defended, nor could any troops there be
relieved or rescued. With that thought in mind, England had
reduced its presence in Hong Kong to a shadow of its former
power by moving most of its defensive weaponry to strengthen
Singapore.
Having weakened "Fortress Hong Kong" the British began to have
second thoughts. It was decided to hold Hong Kong, and reinforce
it modestly, even as the threat of war grew ever closer. Japan
was thought to be somewhat ambivalent in its feelings towards
the West in late 1941. The thinking was ... if Hong Kong were to
be reinforced, even slightly, it could well dissuade the
Japanese from taking hostile action against the Colony. It might
also boost the morale of the Chinese soldiers fighting under
Chinese General Chiang Kai Shek who had been fighting the
Japanese since 1938. If the English just left the gates open for
Japan to take Hong Kong it would leave the Chinese without
allies in the area. It might also cause the British to "lose
face". The maintenance of dignity in the face of adversity
is a facet of what is called "saving face" in Asia, and is very
important. For the British to "lose face" could well make a
critical situation in the Far East worse, perhaps even make war
more likely.
It was also believed that, in the event of war, defending Hong
Kong, for any length of time would tie up thousands of Japanese
troops and prevent their participation in other theatres of war.
Hong Kong was a mighty fortress. The Japanese could be tied up
for a long time trying to take it. If Hong Kong were to be
overrun the Japanese would pay a heavy price in wounded and
dead. Troops would be required to occupy and control the Colony.
More troops would be required to guard any captured prisoners.
It seemed to make sense that if Japan thought Hong Kong worth
taking it must be worth keeping.
What was not known for certain, but certainly suspected by
Allied Intelligence was that Japan had been planning war with
the West for years. Their war plan called for the capture and
destruction of all western possessions, then from a position of
power, Japan would negotiate a peace accord to its benefit. The
Japanese had made plans as far back as 1939, or earlier, to
invade Hong Kong, Kowloon, Singapore and Macau.
The decision not to reinforce Hong Kong was reversed. Troops
would required to do the job, but Britain could not commit
anymore of her own. She had troubles enough in Europe. General
A.E. Grasset, the General Officer Commanding British Troops in
China, returned to England and made a powerful appeal to Winston
Churchill's military advisors to ask for Canadian troops to
reinforce Hong Kong. Churchill wrote later: " ... there was not
the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong, or relieving it if
the Japanese were to attack." In spite of his misgivings he
asked his government to act on Grasset's request and made an
appeal to Canada, by telegram, to send the required troops. The
Government of Canada was asked to provide whatever units were
available.
The British telegram said, in essence, that the situation in the
Far East had changed significantly and that a small
reinforcement of the garrison of Hong Kong was justifiable. The
telegram also implied that any troops posted there would be in
no immediate danger. But, the British High Command secretly
suspected that war with Japan was going to take place sooner or
later, likely sooner.
The Canadian War Committee, and the Liberal Government of
William Lyon Mackenzie King, quickly made the decision to send
the requested troops. They made the decision based on the
telegram's "assurances", and the Chief of the Canadian General
Staff, Major General H.D.C. Crerar's statement that, in his
opinion, .... he "saw no military risks in dispatching Canadian
Battalions" to Hong Kong. He, "definitely recommended that the
Canadian Army should take this on." The Minister of Defense, J.E.
Ralston wasn't convinced that Crerar was right, but with some
misgivings in his mind, went along with the plan anyway.
The Minister of Defense later explained his thinking. "It seemed
to me that we had an opportunity to make a contribution, perhaps
not large in numbers, but certainly effective in results, which
should not be disregarded".
Meanwhile, the Canadian Military Establishment had been chaffing
at the bit because no Canadian troops had yet seen action in
Europe. Of course neither had any other troops at that time,
except at Dunkirk. At any rate the "Establishment" were anxious
for Canada to get in on the action.
In May of 1940, the Winnipeg Grenadiers, a militia unit, were
called to active duty. In late June of 1940, so were the Royal
Rifles of Canada. The Grenadiers were given the task of guarding
"Internment Camps", in Bermuda and Jamaica. They became prison
guards. Their duties left little time for the Grenadiers to
further their training. The Royal Rifles were to guard the
shores of Newfoundland as part of what was called "The Internal
Security Formations". The nature of their duties allowed the
Royal Rifles to train for two and a half months in Sussex, New
Brunswick before being sent to Newfoundland where they continued
to train on a daily basis for nine and a half more months.
Given the location of their postings the Canadian Government did
not expect either unit to see any action. German U Boats roamed
the North Atlantic sinking thousands of tons of ships and their
priceless cargo's, but there were no surface ships off either
shore. While an assault on either location was possible it was
highly unlikely.
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